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Abstract: This article investigates how the public expenditure structure, and the expenditures in specific 
fields of the public sector, are affected by the dynamics of interest payment on public debt, in the case of 
Italy. Italy has the third largest public debt in the world, and interest payments are of considerable size; 
though not steadily, however, their dynamics has been decreasing over the last two decades. This could have 
represented an opportunity for restructuring public expenditure. However, our results show that there is no 
effect of the dynamics of interest payments upon the dynamics of primary public expenditure. The result is 
based on the analysis of both Granger-causality links and simultaneous relations between interest payments 
and primary public expenditure. Public expenditure is considered in aggregate terms in current and capital 
account, and as articulated in a number of specific areas.  
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JEL Classification: H50, H61. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Interest payments on government debt is a great concern and a serious constraint for public 
spending, especially in countries with large stock of public debt. Contraction (or limited increase) of 
public expenditures in specific fields are often justified by policy-makers by resorting to obvious 
constraints deriving from interest payments; real or potential advantages deriving from interest 
payment reduction is an ever-green in election campaigns. 
 It is beyond any doubt that the variation of debt cost can have a deep impact on the political 
choices concerning public spending. Here we aim at evaluating whether and how interest payments 
really affect the dynamics and structure of primary public expenditure, taking Italy as the case 
study.  
                                                            
1Corresponding Author: Roberto Cellini, Department of Economics and Business - University of Catania. Corso Italia 
55 - 95129, Catania, Italy. Tel +39 095 7537728, fax +39 0957537710, e-mail cellini@unict.it 
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 Italy has the third largest stock of public debt in the world. Its interest payments have been 
decreasing, though not monotonically, over the last two decades. This pattern is substantially due to 
lower interest rates, firstly driven by the adoption of Euro and, subsequently, by the quantitative 
easing policy of the ECB. However, interest payment still represents a significant component of the 
Italian public expenditure, able to drive the primary surplus into a gross deficit in public balance.  
 The evaluation of the changes in primary public spending due to the dynamics of the interest 
payment is the issue of the present analysis. However, our results show that the dynamics of interest 
payment have exerted insignificant effect on the dynamics of primary spending, in Italy over the 
last twenty years. Section 2 provides a description of the data under consideration. Section 3 
provides the econometric analysis, aimed to detect possible influence of interest payments on 
specific components of public expenditure. Robustness checks of our conclusion are offered by 
Section 4. Comments and concluding remarks are gathered in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Data 
 
The data under consideration are from official sources: data on interest payments and aggregate 
public accounting derive from AMECO (the database of the European Commission), while the data 
on specific government expenditures are from the Italian Ministry of Economic Development 
(database CPT - ‘Conti Pubblici Territoriali’, i.e., RPA, ‘Regional Public Account’, in English). 
The latter databank, consistent with AMECO, provides data classified according to different 
criteria, including the sectoral criterion, and covering the expenses of the different layers of public 
administration (central State, regions, local administrations). The consideration of CPT as the data-
source for analysing public expenditure structure is recommendable, because de-centralization 
processes have taken place in Italy over the time span under consideration, and some competencies 
and expenditures have been moved from the central state to regions or local administrations; this 
institutional change is immaterial to our purpose (and our data).2 All data are freely downloadable 
from the web.3   
                                                            
2 Note that  we consider here the public expenditures from public administration (State, regions, local administration): 
CPT also provides data on expenditures of the so-called public administration in brad sense, which also include firms 
and enterprises under the control of state; however, the expenditures of these entities are not considered in our present 
analysis. 
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm for AMECO, and 
http://www.agenziacoesione.gov.it/it/cpt/ for CPT; however, a file containing only the relevant series is available from 
the Authors upon request. 
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 Data from AMECO (namely, interest payments and total public spending in current and 
capital account, as well as social transfers) are available for the 1960-2015 timespan; the available 
timespan is restricted to 1996-2014 as to the CPT data (public expenditure for selected sectors). In 
this analysis we consider annual data over the period 1996-2014, even when longer time series are 
available.4  
 Figure 1.a,b,c show the pattern of interest payments, in nominal and real terms, and as the 
share in total public spending, over the long run (1960-2015) in Italy. The pattern is driven by the 
amount of the stock of public debt, joint with the dynamics of interest rates – influenced by internal 
and external factors. We are not interested in discussing here the reasons that have driven the Italian 
public debt to peak at beyond 115% of GDP in 1996, starting from 65% in mid-1980s (this ratio has 
reached its maximum in 2014 at 132%, following the financial and economic crisis started in 2008). 
Nor are we interested in dealing with the macroeconomic effects of the fiscal consolidation policies, 
that have taken place in first decade of 2000s, in Italy as well as in most European countries.5 As far 
as the unit cost of debt is concerned, we are clearly aware that it is endogenous to policy decisions, 
at least to some extent. However, its long-run movements are largely led by exogenous  
(international) factors, such as the increase of interest rates over the Reaganomics years (during the 
1980s), or the decrease started in mid 1990s; the drop has been particularly high for Italy, thanks to 
its adhesion to Euro, and in the most recent years thanks  to  the   ECB monetary policy. Figure 2  
focuses on the last twenty years, and reports the pattern of interest payments in the recent period 
1996-2014, in nominal and real terms. In nominal terms, expenditure for interest payments on 
public debt moved from 115 billion Euros in 1996 to 74.3 in 2014. Consider that, in this period, the 
price dynamics has been very moderate, so that dealing with nominal or real figures is pretty similar 
–as the graph makes clear. In what follows, we consider nominal figures, while the consideration of 
real figures will be done as a robustness check in the final section of our investigation.  
 
                                                            
4 When lagged variables are involved in the analysis, the first observations are missing for series available from 1996, 
while they are used for series available from 1960. 
5 See, e.g., Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Corsetti et al. (2012), Perotti (2013), Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), 
Cafiso and Cellini (2014) on these issues. 
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Figure 1 ‐ Pattern of public debt interest payments (nominal, real, as a share of total public spending) 
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Figure 2 ‐ Pattern of public debt interest payment over 1996‐2015 (in nominal and real terms, price 1996) 
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 The series of payments for interest on the public debt (INT) will be treated as the 
explanatory variable  (x-variable), and its effects will be investigated on a set of dependent y-
variables.  Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of all series under consideration, in level and in 
first-difference.  
 Note that nominal total primary public expenditure has been steadily increasing over 1996-
2014: the minimum values for both current and capital expenses in nominal terms occur in 1996, 
while the maximum values are at the end of the time sample; the pattern in real terms is also 
steadily increasing (with exceptions for 2011 and 2012). At a first approximation, public 
expenditure in Italy has grown in nominal terms, also for any specific item under consideration, and 
the average value of the first-difference is positive for any considered item. However, at a closer 
look,  the picture concerning the amount and the timing of increases and drops in nominal spending 
for specific items is mixed, and it makes sense to ask whether some relations exist between the 
dynamics of the expenditure on specific items and the pattern of interest payment. 
 It is worth underlying once again that CPT aggregates the public expenditures of different 
layers of government (State, regions, local administration) for any specific item. Thus, it should 
appear not strange that, say, culture entails a similar amount of public expenditure as defence: at the 
central state level, defence expenditure is larger than the public spending for culture, but the 
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opposite is true when considering expenses of regions and local administrations. Social transfers are 
mainly made by pension payment, and account by about one-third of public expenditure. 
 
Table 1 ‐ Series under consideration (1996‐2014) 
VARIABLE 
 
Description: 
public 
expenditure in  
Mean Min 
(year) 
Max 
(year) 
Mean Min 
(year) 
Max 
(year) 
Level  First‐difference 
INT Interests on public debt 
78.29  66.72 
(2004) 
115.58 
(1996) 
‐1.87  ‐15.70 
(1997) 
7.79 
(2007) 
GCCN Current account (net of interests) 
554.15  379.63 
(1996) 
690.90 
(2014) 
17.85  14.31 
(2011) 
28.66 
(2001) 
GCK Capital account  34.89  23.29 (1996) 
44.43 
(2013) 
1.14  ‐0.28 
(2014) 
2.04 
(2002) 
GSOCT Social transfer  246.15  165.77 (1996) 
326.86 
(2014) 
8.95  4.13 
(1998) 
14.36 
(2009) 
GDEFEN Defence (military)  13.93  8.64 (1997) 
18.51 
(2009) 
0.28  ‐3.56 
(2010) 
3.24 
(2008) 
GHEALTH Health  85.07  50.00 (1996) 
115.30  
(2012) 
3.03  ‐10.58 
(2014) 
11.54 
(2012) 
GEDU Education  49.22  
36.17 
(1996) 
57.68 
(2008) 
0.85  ‐2.43 
(2007) 
6.44 
(2001) 
GCULT Culture  11.09  
7.16 
(1996) 
18.71 
(2004) 
0.05  ‐3.52 
(2008) 
5.87 
(2004) 
GTUR Tourism  1.34  0.94 (2014) 
1.65 
(2006) 
‐0.07  ‐0.29 
(2010) 
0.25 
(1998) 
Note: all figures are in billion Euros, current value.  
 
 
 3. Regression analysis 
 
First, we evaluate whether Granger-causality links (Granger, 1969, 1988) exist. Of course, we 
expect no-Granger causality from the expenditure on specific items to the payment for interests on 
debt, since the latter variable is largely depending on external factors, and has an exogenous nature. 
Admittedly, specific policy choices concerning the public balance and the expectations on debt 
sustainability may influence the interest payment, but this aspect is hard to be captured by the 
dynamics of the expenditure on specific areas of government action. It is more interesting to 
evaluate whether the payments for interest on debt have an influence (in the sense of Granger 
causality) upon specific areas of public spending. The motivation behind this research question is to 
evaluate whether or not the reduction (or the increase) of the interest payment has an impact on the 
dynamics of the public expenditure in specific areas. Table 2 provides the results of this simple 
exercise.  
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Table 2.‐ Granger‐causality 
 yInterest      Interesty   
 
y-variable: 
1A 
(one lag) 
1B
(two lags) 
2A
(one lag) 
2B
(two lags) 
GCCN F1,17=2.66 p=0.121 
F2,15=2.38 
p=0.126 
  F1,17=1.61 
p=0.221 
F2,15=1.81 
p=0.198 
GCK F1,17=0.58 p=0.455 
F2,15=0.55 
p=0.591 
  F1,17=0.09 
p=0.761 
F2,15=0.78 
p=0.477 
GSOCT F1,14=11.15*** p=0.005 
F2,11=2.62 
p=0.117 
  F1,14=0.003 
p=0.954 
F2,11=0.95 
p=0.416 
GDEFEN F1,14=0.70 p=0.416 
F2,11=0.35 
p=0.712 
  F1,14=3.09 
p=0.100 
F2,11=1.87 
p=0.200 
GHEALTH F1,14=0.02 p=0.878 
F2,11=0.98 
p=0.405 
  F1,14=1.70 
p=0.213 
F2,11=1.38 
p=0.292 
GEDU F1,14=0.14 p=0.717 
F2,11=0.85 
p=0.453 
  F1,14=1.52 
p=0.238 
F2,11=0.87 
p=0.448 
GCULT F1,14=4.78** p=0.046 
F2,11=2.77 
p=0.106 
  F1,14=0.28 
p=0.603 
F2,11=0.67 
p=0.530 
GTUR F1,14=0.94 p=0.350 
F2,11=0.36 
p=0.357 
  F1,14=0.91 
p=0.603 
F2,11=0.88 
p=0.440 
Note:  In  Column  1A,  the  test  on  the  null  hypothesis  01    is  reported  w.r.t.  regression  equation 
tttt uxyy   11110   where  x  denotes  the  interest  payment,  and  y  is  the  primary  public  expenditures 
under investigation. Column 1B considers Granger‐causality with two lags, i.e., it reports the result of the test on the 
null  021    w.r.t. regression equation  tttttt uxxyyy   221122110  . Column 2A and 2B 
report the test on the Granger‐causality running from y to x, considering one or two lags, respectively. In all cases, the 
null is the absence of Granger‐causality. Time sample is 1996‐2014 for all variables; for INT,GCC and GCK observations 
are available for the 1960‐2015 time‐span, so that introduction of  lagged variables do not imply missing observations. 
 
 
 It is not surprising that the variation of y-variable does not Granger-cause the variation of 
expenses for interests, and this holds for each of the y-variables under consideration. It is more 
interesting to note that, generally speaking, no Granger-causality links emerge, running from for the 
variation of interest payments to the variation of the considered y-variables. The two exceptions 
regards the social transfers and the public expenditure in culture, which appear to be Granger-
caused by interest payment, in the case of one lag. However, in the case of social transfers, the 
corresponding regression provides a positive coefficient linking the social transfers to the one-year-
lagged interest payments: an increase of interest payments leads to a subsequent increase in social 
transfers -which has no meaning from an economic point of view. For this reason, we are induced to 
believe that the emerging Granger-causality is the outcome from spurious relation. In the case of 
expenditure on culture, the regression coefficient shows a negative sign, indicating that a reduction 
in interest payment leads to a subsequent increase in public spending in culture. Admittedly, this 
outcome is interesting, and we have tried to investigate further, to understand whether it can tell a 
story. For instance, one could argue that Granger-causality may emerge for the expenditure on items 
whose size is limited while interest payment is not able to Granger-cause expenditure on items of 
large size.  However, the story is far from being robust and convincing. Indeed, causality disappears 
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if two lags are considered (as the Table 2 makes clear). Moreover, the absence of causality emerges 
for a number of areas, of similar size as culture, for which we have checked: for instance, public 
expenditure in tourism. Again, at a closer look at data,  the causality in the case of expenditure in 
culture is driven by the expenditures from the local administrations, while no causality emerges if 
we select the Central State expenditure in culture. Thus, the emergence of causality in this area 
appears to us as a spurious result, rather than a sign of a robust relation, or a part of a wider story.  
 The result of the absence of Granger-causality is robust to the consideration of one or two 
lags in all other cases. Thus, our first conclusion is clear-cut: the dynamics of interest payments did 
not affect the primary public expenditure (in aggregate terms, in current or capital account), nor the 
public expenditure in a number of specific areas. That is, the structure of primary public spending is 
not affected (in the sense of Granger-causality) by the dynamics of interest payment. 
 As far as simultaneous relations between variations of variables under scrutiny are 
concerned, we investigate the following regression equation:  
 
(1) tttt exbyaay  110  
 
where x denotes the payments for interest, and y is any variable in the set of primary public 
expenditures under investigation. Though rather ‘basic’, such a specification is appropriate to our 
goal and our datasets; Table 3 provides the results.  
  
Table 3.‐ Simultaneous relations (regression equation (1)). 
 
 GCCN GCK GSOCT GDEFEN GHEALTH GEDU GCULT GTUR 
a0 
6.59e+09 
(1.59) 
1.74 
(0.67) 
6.39e+06** 
(2.70) 
446321 
(1.02) 
3.34e+06* 
(1.86) 
1.08e+06 
(1.47) 
‐31207 
(‐0.05) 
‐16682 
(‐0.57) 
a1 
0.63 ** 
(2.74)  
0.78*** 
(3.99) 
0.26 
(1.03) 
‐0.04 
(‐0.14) 
0.07 
(0.20) 
‐0.28 
(‐1.02) 
‐0.08 
(‐0.32) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
b 0.21  (0.82) 
0.0002 
(0.02) 
‐0.019 
(‐0.178) 
0.02 
(0.300) 
0.27 
(1.43) 
‐0.03 
(‐0.03) 
‐0.05 
(‐0.48) 
‐0.006 
(‐1.329) 
R2 0.31  0.48  0.07  0.01  0.13  0.07  0.02  0.14 
F F2,17=3.77 ** 
(p=0.04) 
F2,17=7.99 *** 
(p=0.003) 
F2,14=0.56  
(p=0.58) 
F2,14=0.07  
(p=0.93) 
F2,14=0.040 
(p=0.93) 
F2,14=0.55 
(p=0.59) 
F2,14=0.18 
(p=0.84) 
F2,14=1.16 
(p=0.34) 
Autocor 
test 
F1,16=2.70 
(p=0.12) 
F1,16=0.07 
(p=0.79) 
F1,13=3.96* 
(p=0.07) 
F1,13=0.02 
(p=0.88) 
F1,13=0.40 
(p=0.53) 
F1,13=0.39 
(p=0.55) 
F1,13=4.5* 
(p=0.053) 
F1,13=0.03 
(p=0.958) 
Test on 
b=0 
F1,17=0.67 
(p=0.423) 
F1,17=0.0002 
(p=0.987) 
F1,14=0.03 
(0.860) 
F1,14=0.09 
(0.768) 
F1,14=2.05 
(0.174) 
F1,14=0.001 
(0.978) 
F1,14=0.23 
(0.640) 
F1,14=1.76 
(0.205) 
Note:  t‐statistics  in parenthesis. */**/*** denote  significance at  the 10%, 5%, 1%  level,  respectively. Autocorrelation  test  is  the 
Breush‐Godfrey LM test on residual serial autocorrelation (one lag). 
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In no cases, coefficient b is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This means that the 
variation of interest payment does not exert any simultaneous effect on the public spending in the 
area under consideration. More in general, the regression equation is globally not significant in all 
cases concerning specific areas, as the very poor F statistics make clear. 
 
 
4. Result robustness and further checks 
 
The result of the absence of significant effect of the dynamics of interest payment upon both the 
whole primary public expenditure and the public expenditure in specific areas is robust to the 
consideration of different specification designs: the inclusion of a deterministic linear trend and/or 
the inclusion of further lags of the explanatory variable do not change the substantial outcome of the 
analysis. Neither the consideration of the variables in real terms –using the gross domestic product 
deflator– with reference to both x and y variables, drive to different pieces of evidence. Detailed 
results are available from the Authors. 
 A point worth investigating concerns the possibility of asymmetric effects of increase or 
decrease in the amount of interest payment upon the dynamics of public expenditures under 
scrutiny. To this end we consider the following specification: 
 
(2) t
neg
t
pos
ttt exbxbyaay   21110  
 
where variable x is split into two separate variables, according to the occurrence of a positive or a 
negative value; that is,  
 

 

 
otherwise
xifx
x
otherwise
xifx
x ttnegt
ttpos
t 0
0
;
0
0
 
 
 In the sample under consideration, x is positive (negative) in 8 (10) out of 18 available 
observations.6 We are interested in evaluating the statistical significance of coefficients b1 and b2, 
                                                            
6 For the interest rate payments (as well as for public expenditure in current and capital account), we have observations 
for the sample 1960 to 2015, so that the observation referred to the first-difference in 1996 is available; however, the 
1996 observation is not used in multiple regressions considering public spending in specific sectors, since these 
observations are available for the sample 1996-2014.  
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and in evaluating the result of a test on the equality b1=b2. Results are reported in Table 4. In all 
cases, b-coefficients are statistically insignificant, and no asymmetric effect between positive and 
negative differences emerges. Thus, once again, the variation in interest payment have not exerted 
any effect on the dynamics of specific primary expenditures. This result also applies to the 
regression equations pertaining real variables.7  
 
Table 4.‐ Asymmetric simultaneous relations (regression equation (2)).  
 GCN GCK GSOCT GDEFENSE GHEALTH GEDU  GCULT GTUR 
a0 
 
9870e+06 
(1.57) 
532e+06 
(1.08) 
5.015e+06  ‐484806 
(‐0.64) 
2.77e+06 
(1.09) 
2.38e+06** 
(2.01) 
352484 
(0.29) 
‐33237 
a1 
0.48** 
(1.84) 
0.62*** 
(2.33) 
0.32 
(1.20) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
‐0.22 
(‐0.82) 
‐0.12 
(‐0.42) 
0.09 
(0.32) 
b1 
‐0.01 
(‐0.002) 
‐0.04 
(‐0.66) 
0.20 
(0.65) 
0.27 
(1.49) 
0.43 
(0.82) 
‐0.35 
(‐1.28) 
‐0.15 
(‐0.52) 
‐0.002 
(‐0.12) 
b2 
0.16 
(0.40) 
0.02 
(0.54) 
‐0.13 
(‐0.72) 
‐0.10 
(‐0.96) 
0.19 
(0.57) 
0.20 
(1.09) 
0.008 
(0.05) 
‐0.008 
(‐1.12) 
R2 0.22  0.39  0.11  0.15  0.14  0.19  0.04  0.15 
F F3,15=1.44  F3,15=3.14*  F3,13=0.56  F3,13=0.78  F3,13=0.68  F3,13=1.02  F3,13=0.16  F3,13=0.77 
Autocorr 
test 
F1,14=3.45* 
(p=0.08) 
F1,15=0.17 
(p=0.69) 
F1,12=11.2***
(p=0.006) 
F1,12=0.10 
(p=0.76) 
F1,12=0.19 
(p=0.67) 
F1,12=0.27 
(p=0.61) 
F1,12=2.14 
(p=0.17) 
F1,12=0.02 
(p=0.90) 
Test on 
b1=b2 
F1,15=0.021 
(p=0.88) 
F1,15=0.47 
(p=0.51) 
F1,13=0.58 
(p=0.46) 
F1,13=2.19 
(p=0.16) 
F1,13=0.11 
(p=0.75) 
F1,13=1.89 
(p=0.19) 
F1,13=0.14 
(p=0.71) 
F1,13=0.15 
(p=0.71) 
Note: t‐statistics in parenthesis. */**/*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have aimed to evaluate the link between the dynamics of interest payments on 
public debt and primary public expenditure in Italy, over the last twenty years. We have found no 
relation between the dynamics of interest payments, on one side, and the dynamics of primary 
public expenditure, on the other side. The absence of influence regards the global amount of 
primary public spending in current and capital account, as well as the specific amount of public 
expenditure in a number of selected areas. The absence of links emerges as evaluated both 
according to the Granger-causality perspective and in a simultaneous relation framework. The 
absence of clear links also emerges if we consider separately increase and drop of interest 
payments: smaller or larger cost of public debt do not appear to exert any significant impact on the 
                                                            
7  There is one exception, namely, the relation between real interest payment and real primary spending in current 
account, where the positive variation of interest payment emerges to exert a negative, statistically significant, effect on 
real current expenditure; however, the specification suffers from residual autocorrelation, and a proper treatment of 
autocorrelation leads to the usual insignificant relation between interest payment and specific spending; moreover, the 
negative variation of real interest payment (which represents the largest part of cases in the sample over scrutiny) does 
not exert any significant effect on the dynamics of real primary current expenditure.  
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dynamics of primary public expenditure in Italy. Thus, a sound conclusion of our analysis can be 
drawn: there are not specific sectors of government action which have suffered or benefitted in 
specific way from the increase or drop of interest payment on public debt; again,  the potential 
advantages linked to lower interest payments –which have characterised the last decades of 
economic life of Italy, in a long-run perspective– have not translated into a clear revision of public 
expenditure. The difficulty of Italian policy-making in achieving a convincing spending review, 
documented in several economic and politic analyses,8 is a coherent piece with the picture coming 
from our present analysis. 
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